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Abstract: UNASUR currently represents one of the most promising regionalization 
projects currently taking place. One of its unique characteristics is the high level of security 
sector integration that has already taken place in the short few years since its inception. This 
is particularly interesting as it is in stark contrast with the security sector regionalization of 
Europe. Despite its much longer history of regionalization, European security sector 
integration is still fragmented into many different organizations with overlapping goals, and 
whose members often include countries outside the European boarder. In the face of this 
apparent success in its regionalist ambitions, one can not help but question: What is the logic 
behind South American security sector regionalism under UNASUR? Furthermore, how and 
why does it regionalists efforts differ from those of the EU? Through an analysis of how 
Regional Security Complex Theory, New Regionalism Approach, and Post-Hegemonic 
Regionalism interpret both the genesis and functionality of UNASUR, one is able to find 
some important insights with regards to South America’s security sector integration. 
Geographically contingent security concerns, intensified by the impacts of globalization, has 
lead South American states to pursuit a unique security arrangement, which rejects the 
neoliberal orthodoxy and the hegemonic presence of the United States. Unlike Europe, South 
America’s security complex does not overlap with other regions and, most importantly, does 
not include the presence of the United Sates. Furthermore, Europe has carried over many of 
its Cold War era security mechanisms, in large part due to its embrace of the Washington 
Consensus and the neoliberal economic orthodoxy. This analysis addresses the broader 
issues regarding the transferability of theoretical approaches across different regions, but 
perhaps more interestingly it hints at the potential for the wider security regionalization of 
the Americas, and whether it will seek to align with, or reject the presence of the US 
hegemon.
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The logic of South American Security Sector Regionalism under UNASUR
1. Introduction
Since the mid 1980's there has been a renewed interest in the study of regionalism. 
The signing of the Single European Act has done a lot for the deepening and widening of 
European integration efforts but has also inspired a new wave of regional projects around the 
world. These so called “New Regionalism” efforts differentiate themselves from the “first 
wave” of the 1930's, and “second” wave of the 1950's-1970's, as they transcend traditional 
free trade issues, incorporating other areas such as security and the impacts of globalization. 
This transcendence, in turn, can be seen as reflecting “the changes in the international system 
and the prevailing economic orthodoxy between the 1950's and the present day” (Hettne, 
2008).
Indeed the success of the European Union (EU) in creating a single common market 
and ushering in a new era of cooperation and peace in the continent has inspired many 
regions to follow suit and launch their own regional projects modeled after the EU, such as 
the African Union and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Of these, 
UNASUR has proven particularly successful, and today stands as one of the regional 
integration efforts with the greatest level of formal institutionalization after the EU. 
 Whilst previous attempts at regionalisation in South America would lead one to 
approach UNASUR with an understandable level of skepticism, developments in the security 
sector show promising signs. In the five short years since the signing of its constitutive treaty, 
UNASUR has already developed a significant level of security regionalisation through the 
formation of the South American Defense Council, increased military transparency and 
cooperation, as well as crisis management, and foreign policy alignment. Security sector 
integration in the EU however, has been a much longer and arduous process, and to this day 
it still remains largely fragmented into several institutions with overlapping aims and 
membership, and which at times extends beyond the European border. Examples include the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), as well as the External Action Service (EEAS).
In the face of such apparent eagerness to regionalize its security sector, one can not 
help but question: what is the logic behind South American security sector regionalism? 
Furthermore, how and why does UNASUR's security sector regionalism differ from other 
regional integration efforts, such as those in the EU?
In order for one to determine the logic behind UNASUR's security sector regionalism, 
one must identify the motivations and reasoning behind this regionalist effort. To do so, this 
thesis will examine three separate critical theories of regionalism focusing on security, and 
will compare the explanatory powers of these with an eye for creating a holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon. By accepting that most theoretical approaches toward 
regionalism are complementary as opposed to competing, a framework focusing on two 
separate aspects of regionalism, Genesis and Functionality will be applied to these critical 
theories, assessing their ability to explain the motivations behind the regionalism efforts in 
South America. Through this framework, UNASUR's experience will then be compared to 
those of Europe in order to better understand how security sector regionalism differs between 
these regions despite their common ambitions.
The two cases to be used in this thesis are UNASUR and the EU. UNASUR was 
chosen as the central case for analysis as it represents one of the most recent, and arguably, 
promising regional integration efforts currently taking place. As it was only established in 
2008, very little research has been conducted on this organization, and those that do, 
generally focus on its constitutive organizations, the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) 
and the Comunidad Andina (CAN). Therefore UNASUR, with a much more ambitious 
integration agenda than its predecessors, offers a fascinating case for comparing different 
regional integration efforts. While any case comparison must be done with care to avoid Euro-
centrism and bias, the European Union was chosen as it provides a valuable case for 
comparison, as its long history of regional integration and diverse body of research still 
provides important avenues for learning.
This analysis should provide an important insight into the uniqueness of the South 
American experience as well as the universality and transferability of regionalism theories 
across geographic areas. Furthermore, this thesis addresses the broader issues regarding the 
comparability of the European experience, identification of different patterns of security 
sector regionalism, as well as the benefits of a multi-theoretical approach. By exploring the 
motivations behind security regionalism under UNASUR, one can also shed a light into 
potential future developments in the broader region. The success of UNASUR and the extent 
to which South America will regionalize its security sector can hint at the potential for the 
more ambitious Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) to follow 
suit. The development of a broader Continental bloc, as it stands, has no intention of 
including the United States amongst its members. As these institutions develop it will be 
interesting to see how the U.S., which has long forged closer ties to Europe than Latin 
America, will respond to its development.
The remainder of this thesis will proceed in five parts: First, a brief historical 
background of South American regionalism and the institutional framework of UNASUR and 
its constituent organizations will be presented in order to provide some historical context to 
the analysis. Second, the theoretical framework and literature review will be presented, 
introducing the critical theories to be used. Third, the research design and methodology will 
be described, and the hypothesis to be tested against the cases will be presented. Fourth, 
through process tracing, the analysis of the hypothesis will be carried out applying the 
individual theoretical perspectives to the UNASUR case. And finally, a comparison between 
UNASUR's and the EU's experience will be conducted in order to determine how and why 
UNASUR differs from other regionalism experiences.
2. South American Regionalism 
South America has had a long history with regionalism movements, albeit with a 
mixed track record in terms of institutional results. Its earliest manifestations can be traced to 
the independence movements and liberation wars of the early 19th century (Arenas-Garcia, 
2012).  Revolutionary heroes from Francisco de Miranda to Simon Bolivar, all dreamed of a 
unified continental empire, bringing together the entire region previously ruled by the Iberian 
powers, Portugal and Spain (Seabra, 2010). Bolivar's “Great Colombia” is perhaps one of the 
best examples of such unification attempts. However, despite its noble ideals, internal 
struggle soon led to fragmentation, and regional unification was soon abolished in favor of 
less ambitious goals. In the end, the wars of independence resulted in similar administrative 
division as during colonial times, which in turn resulted in nationalism, and territorial 
disputes among the many newly established states (Arenas-Garcia, 2012).
It was not until after World War II that a new effort to promote regional integration 
began to gain memento and the region began to experience a new drive towards regional 
formation (Arenas-Garcia, 2012). In 1948, after a series of regional congresses, 21 countries 
met in Bogota and signed the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), creating 
the first truly comprehensive continental agreement that also incorporated defense issues 
(Seabra, 2010). The advent of the Cold War, however, quickly discredited the organization, 
and it soon began to be seen merely as a tool of the United Stated government to clamp down 
on communism and enforce its influence in the region (Seabra, 2010). Latin America soon 
embarked in a period of repeated regionalisation failures. Agreements such as the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which was later replaced by the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI)  all failed to produced their desired goals, and were soon 
adapted or abolished all together (Seabra, 2010). 
Despite the many repeated failures, the second half of the 20th century eventually 
produced some important developments in cooperation, which ultimately led to the formation 
of UNASUR. Chief among them was the signing of the 1969 Andean Pact, which built on the 
failures of LAFTA by improving participation and gradually creating a common market 
(Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). While successful at first, the bloc soon was faced with a 
series of internal crises and disagreements, ranging from the politicization of integration 
issues, recurrent democratic instabilities, to unequal distribution of costs and benefits of the 
project (Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). One of the proposed solutions for these crises was the 
formation of a dispute settlement mechanism for its members, which ultimately resulted in 
the formation of the Court of Justice and Andean Parliament in 1979. It was not until the 
1990's with the formation of the Andean Presidential Council, and the changing of its name 
to the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), that further opening and deepening of the 
integration process took place (Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). Despite having high levels of 
institutionalization and creating a common market, CAN failed to bring peace, stability and 
development to its member states, ultimately resulting in certain members leaving the bloc or 
seeking complementary regional agreement with third parties (Malamud & Schmitter, 2011).
Perhaps one of the most important developments contributing to further integration of 
the region, however, was the ending of the historical rivalry between Argentina and Brazil 
which had besieged the region from as early as the colonial time and whose end allowed for 
the formation of one of UNASUR constituent organizations, MERCOSUR. The rivalry can 
be seen to have started in 1680 when Portugal established a settlement at the River Plate, 
which was bitterly opposed by the Spanish (Oelsner, 2010). Tensions continued after 
independence and eventually led to the 1825 war between the Argentine Confederation and 
the Brazilian Empire, which ultimately led to the creation of Uruguay. By the end of the 19th 
century, both countries were clearly pursuing diverging development strategies, with 
Argentina seeking closer ties to Europe and Great Britain, while Brazil prioritized its relation 
with the United States (Oelsner, 2010). By the beginning of the 20th century, both countries 
had begun to view each other “as a competitor, as an opponent in many areas, and even as a 
possible enemy” (De la Fuente 1997, P.37). Tensions and rivalry would continue well into 
the 20th century with both countries supporting opposite sides of the First and Second World 
War as well as the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (Hurrell, 1998). It was not until 
1979 with the Signing of the Tripartite Agreement of Itaipú-Corpus, between the countries' 
two military leaders, that tensions would begin to ease. Aside from ending the dispute over 
the construction of the Itaipú dam, the signing of the treaty ushered in a new era of 
cooperation, which ultimately resulted in the signing of the 1985 Declaration of Iguaçú, and 
the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion which created MERCOSUR (Hurrell, 1998). The 
rapprochement of both Argentina and Brazil proved incredibly significant for the 
development of security sector regionalism in South America, in that the use of force 
between Brazil and Argentina became absolutely unthinkable, thus constituting, in and of 
itself, a security community. The section below will further explore the institutional structure 
of CAN and MERCOSUR, which together constitute UNASUR.
 CAN
Previously known as the Andean Pact, the Andean Community of Nations is an 
intergovernmental organization constituted of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
Established in 1969 with the Cartagena Agreement, the bloc was aimed at improving the 
living standards of its peoples through “integration and economic and social cooperation” 
(CAN, 2012). While both Chile and Venezuela were once part of this trading bloc, they have 
since withdrawn their membership (Malamud, Schmitter, 2012). Its areas of action include 
social, political, environmental, external relations, economic and trade, and institution 
building (Malamud, Schmitter, 2012). At the time of its formation, this was the most 
ambitious regional integration effort in South America and was comprised of rather complex 
institutional structures and decision making procedures. Its main institutional bodies 
currently include: the Andean Council of Presidents, the Andean Council on Foreign Affairs, 
the Andean Community Commission, the General Secretariat, as well as the Court of Justice.
The Andean Council of Presidents is the highest level body in the group, and is 
comprised of the presidents of the member countries. Its responsibilities include defining sub-
regional integration policies, and promoting action on the interest of sub-regional integration, 
as well as examining issues related to the integration effort. The council is headed by a 
chairman who represents the community at the highest level and whose position rotates on a 
yearly basis among the presidents of the members states (CAN, 2012). The Andean Council 
on Foreign Affairs, as the name suggests, consists of foreign ministers of each member state, 
and it is responsible for coordinating the position of the bloc in matters related to foreign 
policy, as well as completing agreements on cooperation issues with third parties and 
organizations (CAN, 2012). The Andean Community Commission is the main policy-making 
body of the bloc and shares some of the legislative roles with the Council on Foreign Affairs. 
It consists of representatives from each member state who meet regularly in order to address 
different sectoral issues (CAN, 2012). The General Secretariat is the executive body of the 
community, with the position of Secretary General being elected by general consensus. It is 
empowered with the capacity to draw up proposals and present them to the Commission and 
the Council on Foreign affairs (CAN, 2012). Finally, the Court of Justice is the main judicial 
body of the community, and is headed by four judges, each representing a member state. It is 
responsible for ensuring the legality of community provisions, and that the laws are 
interpreted and applied uniformly throughout the member states (CAN, 2012). The formation 
of the court can be seen as a response to international pressure on the issue of human rights 
abuses in the region during the 1980's and 1990's (International Democracy Watch, 2012).
 MERCOSUR
The Mercado Comun del Sur, or MERCOSUR, was established in 1991 with the 
Treaty of Asuncion, which brought together the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay (MERCOSUR, 2013). The regional bloc was the brain child of Argentinean 
President Alfosin and Brazilian President Sarney in an attempt to provide support to the 
fledgling democratic regimes which were just emerging from decades of military rule 
(Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). The main idea behind the bloc was to lessen domestic 
pressures brought about by increased military spending, by fostering greater cooperation and 
increasing social welfare (Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). The ultimate goal of the bloc was 
the formation of EU-inspired common market encompassing all countries in Latin America. 
MERCOSUR was always intended to remain an intergovernmental organization; therefore, 
decision making was to be made exclusively with the involvement of national officials, and 
unanimous consent was the rule (Malamud & Schmitter, 2011). Its constitutive treaty outlines 
three decision-making bodies, with a further two added later. These include the Common 
Market Council, the Common Market Group and the Trade Commission. 
The Common Market Council is the highest decision-making body of the organization 
and is comprised of the foreign and economic ministers of the member states. Its 
responsibilities include legislation and assessing compliance. It has a six-months rotating 
membership and meets at least once a year, as well as when necessity arises (Keller, 2012). 
The Common Market Group is responsible for the coordination of macroeconomic policies 
between the members of the group, as well as negotiating trade agreement with third parties. 
It is comprised of members from the foreign, economic and trade ministries of the member 
states, and oversees the decisions reached at the Council (Keller, 2012). The Trade 
Commission, as the name suggest, deals with everyday trade between the member states. The 
commission meets monthly to propose changes in the external tariffs of the group, as well as 
to discuss proposal for consideration by the aforementioned bodies (Keller, 2012). Two other 
bodies were later developed within the organization: the MERCOSUR Parliament, and the 
Structural Convergent Found of MERCOSUR. The former, attempts to provide popular 
representation to the body, while the latter aims at increasing regional infrastructure projects 
and cooperation. Their implementation, however, is yet to be fully carried out.
UNASUR
Frustrated by the many failed efforts to advance toward a European Union style of 
unification, the heads of states of the many South America nations began high-level meetings 
in the hope of rekindling the debate. In their first summit in 2000, the heads of states issued 
the Brasilia Declaration, which envisioned not only the establishment of a free trade zone 
between MERCOSUR and CAN, but also a larger focus on the development of the continent. 
The intention to form a regional bloc was further reiterated two years later in Ecuador with 
the Guayaquil Consensus, where the regional “Presidents reiterated their will to continue 
promoting actions of coordination and cooperation with a view to creating a common South 
American space” (UNASUR, 2002).
In 2004 the heads of states met once again, this time in Cusco Peru, to set up the 
ground work for the formation of the regional bloc. Highlighting their shared and unified 
history, as well as the “convergence of political, economic, social, cultural and security 
interests”, it was decided to gradually merge CAN and MERCOSUR, with an eye to avoiding 
institutional duplication, while still seeking further integration in the aforementioned areas 
(Seabra, 2010). Originally called Community of South American States, its name was 
changed to UNASUR in 2007. Finally, in the 2008 Summit of Brasilia, the constitutive treaty 
of UNASUR was signed by all 12 member states, officially establishing UNASUR as a 
functioning regional bloc.
UNASUR consists of three committees that together with the Secretary General (SG), 
form the main executive body of the bloc, these include: the Council of Heads of State, 
Council of Foreign Affairs, and the Council of Delegates. The heads of states of the member 
countries elect the SG which acts as the organization leader for a period of two years 
(UNASUR, 2008a). Former Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, Ali Rodriguez, currently 
holds the presidency and his term due to end in June 2014. Among his/her duties, the SG is 
responsible for facilitating cooperation between the several groups, preparing and presenting 
annual reports, as well as coordinating with other regional organs. UNASUR also has a 
president pro-tempore, which presides over UNASUR's meetings and represents the block in 
international meetings (UNASUR ISAG, 2013). The position is held for one year, and the 
presidency is passed from country to country in alphabetical order. 
The Council of Heads of State is the highest organ of UNASUR and is responsible, 
among its duties, for establishing policy guidelines, actions plans, programmes and projects 
for the South American integration effort (UNASUR, 2008a). Composed by the heads of 
state of each member state, they collectively make decisions regarding proposals made by 
UNASUR's ministerial level councils. The Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, as the name 
suggests, is comprised by the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states, and is 
responsible for implementing the decisions reached by the Council of Heads of State. It 
meets twice a year; however, special sessions may be convened by the President pro-tempore 
at the request of at least half of the member states (UNASUR, 2008a). The Council of 
Delegates is comprised of permanent representatives responsible for the general functioning 
of the Union (Seabra, 2010). They are responsible for implementing the decisions reached at 
the two other councils, as well as promoting dialogue to help increase public participation. 
(Flannery, 2012)
Finally, UNASUR is also comprised of 12 sectoral councils, which are responsible for 
consultation and consensus building on specific issue areas. The main sectoral councils 
dealing with security sector issues are describe below. The South American Defense Council 
(CDS) is perhaps the most significant security sector body in the union. It was established in 
2008 and is comprised of defense ministers of the member states, which meet at least once a 
year (UNASUR, 2008b). According to its establishing document (2008b), the CDS' main 
goals include: to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, to build a South American 
identity on defense, and to build consensus to strengthen cooperation in defense. Within 
CDS, the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) was inaugurated in 2012, with the 
aim of enhancing cooperation and transparency among its member states on issues such as 
military expenditure. More recently, as announced on the communique of the “UNASUR 
Conference on Natural Resources”, the CDS also indicated its intention to create a South 
American School of Defense, in order to jointly train military officers of the 12 member 
states (UNASUR, 2013).
Another important council dealing with security issues is the Council for the Global 
Drug Problem, and as the name suggests, it deals with the drug problem intrinsic to the 
region. The council attempts to harmonize civil, penal, administrative and public policy 
norms on the issue, with the aim of promoting judiciary, policing and intelligence 
cooperation (UNASUR, 2008a). Finally, the South American Council on Citizen Security, 
Justice and Coordination of Actions Against Transnational Organized Crime further deals 
with issues related to transnational crime, and is expected to work in close cooperation with 
the Council for the Global Drug problem (UNASUR, 2008a). An overview of the 
institutional structure of UNASUR can be found in ANNEX 1.
3. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The theoretical perspectives applied in this paper are associated with what scholars 
call the “third” or “new” wave regionalism, which can be seen to have started in earnest with 
the signing of the Single European act in the mid 1980s. They differ from the “old” or “first 
wave” regionalism which is traditionally viewed as economically protectionist and function-
specific. Old regionalism has been generally understood through the context of the Cold War, 
the policies stemming from a bi-polar world, and dependent on superpower patronage 
(Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011).
Some of the earliest approaches to regionalism stem from the functionalist concerns 
of cooperation presented by David Mitrany. Mitrany claimed that technological 
advancements meant that the state was no longer capable of controlling all of its security 
concerns, and therefore international cooperation was becoming essential. The functionalist 
argumentation was further developed by Ernest Haas, in what came to be known as 
neofunctionalism. Haas built on the functionalist argument by highlighting the plurality of 
actors involved in the region building process, blurring the rationality for regionalism as each 
actor seeks integration for their own reasons (Santos, 2008). Haas also broke away from the 
static realist approach by looking at the “spillover effect” of regionalism, which creates 
further interdependence, and stimulates further integration. While Haas assumed it would 
also be applicable outside of Europe, the neofunctionalist approach has been criticized for its 
Euro-centrism, and many view it as a European historical description approach, as oppose to 
a broader regional integration theory with global applicability (Santos, 2008).
The 1980's and 1990's saw a revival of regional projects, particularly in the 
developing world, which had not had any success in this area since the 1960's. This new 
focus on regionalisation was markedly different from the early approaches as it interpreted 
regionalisation through the broader process of global transformation and viewed 
globalization as intrinsically linked to regionalism (Gomez-Mera, 2008). It rejected the state-
centric approach favored by more traditional approaches, and synthesized insights from 
constructivist, reflectivist and post-positivist approaches (Gomez-Mera, 2008). Furthermore, 
and in contrast with old regionalism, the new wave is characterized as being economically 
open. Some scholars have questioned the usefulness of distinguishing between old and new 
regionalism, and instead promote the synthesis of both as the best approach to understanding 
the complexities of regionalism (Gomez-Mera, 2008). This thesis will thus apply theoretical 
approaches that despite originating from the new wave of regionalism, still consider many 
factors traditionally associate with the first and second wave.
 Operationalisation of Terms
Before an analysis can be carried out, it is important to clarify some of the terms to be 
used. The first term in need of defining is region. Due to the variety of literature focusing on 
the topic, defining the term region is not as simple as one would assume. The main focus of 
the analysis will be Macro-regions (or so-called world regions), which are larger territorial 
units or sub-systems between the state level and the global system level and has been the 
most common object of analysis in regionalist studies (DeLomabardi, 2009). A classical 
definition of a (macro-) region is offered by Joseph Nye who defines regions as, “a limited 
number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual 
interdependence” (Nye, 1971). While the “limited number” and the “geographic” 
conditionalities are rather obvious, Nye recognizes that the degree of interdependence could 
vary between different fields (DeLomabardi, 2009).
In order to understand the formation of regions, it is important to also define the 
concept of regionalism. This thesis will use the definition presented in the New Regionalism 
Approach which views regionalism as a “heterogeneous, comprehensive, multidimensional 
phenomenon, constructed by a variety of actors both within and outside the formal regional 
organization (Söderbaum, 2005). This definition is complemented by that of Warleigh-Lack 
which defines regionalism as:
“An explicit, but not necessarily formally institutionalized process of adapting 
participant state norms, policy making process, policy styles, policy content, 
political opportunity structures, economy and identity to both align with, and 
shape new collective set of priorities, norms and interests at regional level, 
which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach stasis.” (Warleigh-Lack ,2006, 
P.758)
Such a definition is broad enough to allow for a cross theoretical comparison, 
however it does not limit regionalism to an “end-goal” where the EU is generally used as the 
desired model of integration.
Defining the term security sector provides it own set of problems, not the least as each 
individual theoretical approach has its own view of what the security sector entails. 
Traditionally, the security sector has been understood from a realist perspective and as the 
result of balance of power in an anarchic system (Buzan & Waever, 2003).With the end of 
the Cold War and the increasing influence of globalization, the idea of security has now 
expanded in order to incorporate a plethora of different issues. No longer is the state viewed 
as the sole actor in the international system capable of influencing the security interaction 
among countries (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The impact of non-state actors, such as terrorist 
and drug cartels, have been increasingly gaining center stage in any discussion of security 
issues. Furthermore the environment, and issues such as food and water security have also 
played a more significant role in the security considerations of nations. With these issues in 
mind, the term security sector will be broadly defined as “all actors and institutions with a 
role of ensuring the security of the state and its people” from traditional (military) security 
threats to those derived from the broader globalization process (Garrasi et al, 2009). Security 
Regionalism, then, can be seen as an attempt by states and other actors in a particular 
geographic area to transform their security complex from a conflict generating inter- and 
intra-state relations to that of a security community with cooperative inter- and intra-regional 
peace (Hettne, 2008).
 Theoretical Perspectives
 As mentioned before, theoretical approaches to regionalism, when appropriately 
defined, are complementary rather then competing. For this reason, the theoretical 
perspectives presented below were chosen not because of their differences in approach but 
because they focus on different aspects of regionalism, and when viewed together, they can 
be seen as quite complementary of one another. The focus here will be on what has been 
defined as “new regionalist studies” that have concentrated on the nascent forms of 
regionalism that have sprung up since the early to mid-1980's. This is not to disregard any 
prior regionalist efforts, but simply to focus the research and to reflect on the changes in the 
international system and prevailing economic orthodoxy since the first waves of regionalism, 
in particular the impact of globalization.
The links between globalization and security regionalism are difficult to discern, not 
least because the security effects of globalization are difficult to distinguish from those 
stemming from the end of the Cold War. Many scholars argue that globalization is 
responsible for complicating the security agenda, but nevertheless, its impact is undeniable, 
and hence any analysis that fails to consider the impacts of globalization runs the risk of only 
uncovering part of the picture (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Finally, and to avoid any Euro-
centric bias,  it is important to also focus on theories that have emerged outside of Europe so 
to determine the extent to which their relevance transcends the regional particularities 
(Söderbaum, 2008).
 Regional Security Complex Theory
The first theoretical approach to be applied to UNASUR is the “Regional Security 
Complex Theory” (RSCT) of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. This approach was chosen due 
to its blend of materialist and constructivist approaches, and can be seen as a synthesis 
between realist and constructivist interpretations. On the materialist side, RSCT applies ideas 
of “bounded territoriality” and distribution of power similar to those presented in neorealism 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003). However, unlike neorealism, it also focuses on the process in 
which security issues are constituted, an approach generally preferred by constructivists 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003). It stands that an issue becomes a security threat once it is perceived 
to affect the survival of some referent object (be it a nation, state, the liberal international 
order, the rainforest, etc) (Buzan and Waever, 2003).
Buzan and Waever define the Regional Security Complex as “a set of units whose 
major process of securitization and desecuritization are both so interlinked that their security 
problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another” 
(Buzan&Waever, 2003, P.44). They claim that there are two components with different 
dynamics which define security complexes, namely the distribution of power between states 
in a specific geographic area and historical patterns of amity and enmity between these states. 
Under RSCT, geographic proximity is paramount as “most political and military threats 
travel most easily over short distances than over long ones” (Buzan & waever, 2003. p. 45). 
RSCT, therefore, is mandated by the interaction between geographic proximity and the forces 
at play in an anarchic system. 
While RSCT presents a novel way in which to understand the formation of security 
communities, one criticism is that it fails to properly consider the impacts of globalization. 
Indeed, while RSCT recognizes the impact of globalization, it suggests that such impacts 
depend on the securitization of globalization issues by the elites. However, in a world 
dominated by terrorist threats, international criminal syndicates, and epidemics, among 
others, claiming that security issues are restricted by geographic proximity fails to grasp the 
complexity and reach of globalization. Due to this lack of emphasis on globalization, a 
second theoretical approach was selected, namely the New Regionalism Approach.
 New Regionalism Approach
The second theoretical approach to be applied to UNASUR is the New Regionalism 
Approach (NRA), particularly focusing on the works of Alex Warleigh-Lack, Bjorn Hettne, 
and Fredrick Söderbaum. NRA differentiates itself from mainstream theoretical approaches 
in that it is epistemologically anti-foundationalist and seeks to combine insights from several 
critical, reflectivist, and constructivist approaches (Gomez-Mera, 2008). They distinguish 
between old and new regionalism in several ways. Firstly, NRA places greater emphasis on 
the links between globalization and regionalisation. Furthermore, unlike the “old” 
regionalism which was often associated with protectionist measures, NRA views regional 
cooperation as much more open and accepting of neo-liberal influences (Söderbaum, 2008). 
Also, the approach tends to focus on informal regionalism from below, with a more pluralist 
perception with regards to the actors driving the process (Söderbaum, 2008). Finally, it views 
regionalism as much more comprehensive and multidimensional. No longer focusing on 
narrow objectives, new regional initiatives tend to be far reaching in scope and ambition, 
taking into account regional practices and issues (Gomez-Mera, 2008).
While consideration for the impacts of globalization in the formation of regions is 
certainly a valuable contribution of this theoretical approach, it has also been criticized by its 
tendency to neglect institutional activity on the part of the state. Indeed it swings too far from 
theories that focus on state-led regionalism, by placing more attention on non-state actors 
(Gomez-Mera, 2008). South America is unique in that non-state actors are not very salient 
and has always depended on, and reacted to, state strategies. Therefore a third theoretical 
approach was selected, namely Post Hegemonic Regionalism.
 Post Hegemonic Regionalism
The third and last theoretical perspective to be applied in this thesis is one which was 
developed in order to specifically explain regionalism efforts in Latin America. Presented by 
Pia Riggirozzi and Dianna Tussie (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012), Post-Hegemonic Regionalism 
(PHR) is a non-liberal theoretical approach which focuses on the instabilities and inequalities 
of the liberal economic order, as well as on the contradictions between the pursuit of 
capitalism and the sustainability of the environment. PHR is linked to three particular 
developments in international politics, namely the aspiration of an emerging South, the 
decline of American hegemonic influence, and the political shift to the left in South America 
(Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). Regionalisation can therefore be seen as a “political and 
security construct in order to respond to globalization challenges and to achieve its members' 
goals in development, regional autonomy (particularly from the US), international influence, 
and at the same time domestic governance of the involved countries” (Sanahuja, 2012, p.25).
This is a valuable theoretical perspective to consider, as it is the only one to be 
intentionally devised in order to explain regionalism in South America. While this could 
complicate its application to the EU case, it may also help explain why certain regionalisation 
processes did not take place in Europe, and the extent to which the South American 
experience transcends regional peculiarities.
4. Research Design and Methodology
In order to successfully compare the different theoretical approaches, it is important to 
apply a synthesized framework, which will allow for a multi-theoretical comparison, as well 
as epistemological and methodological clarity. In an attempt to achieve just such clarity, this 
thesis will adapt a framework presented by Warleigh-Lack. The framework focuses on the 
dependent variable “regionalism” (which in this thesis will be Security Sector Regionalism) 
and four distinct independent variables, namely: genesis, functionality, socialization and 
impact. This analysis, however, is only concerned with the first two variables of this 
framework; genesis and functionality, for reasons explained below. 
By looking at the genesis one can understand the reasoning and motivations behind 
the regional formation. It looks at “why” and “how” the regionalisation process began in the 
first place. Through an analysis of the genesis, and a comparison between both UNASUR and 
EU, one should be able to identify the similarities and uniqueness of the regionalisation 
processes, as well as establish the links between the region’s membership and identity 
(Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011).
 The second independent variable, Functionality, looks at how a region functions once 
it is established and allows us to understand the powers, and in turn, significance of the 
regional security agreements. It deals with questions such as: What actors are involved in 
decision-making, what range of issues does the region address, and how does this change 
over time? This set of questions helps to illuminate the internal workings and power 
distribution of a region, whether internal or external pressures impact its activities, and, 
whether the system responds to members desires for reform (Warleigh-lack et al, 2011). 
When considered together, and in combination with first hand sources, one is able to 
understand the logic behind security sector regionalism in South America. Thus, by applying 
the adapted framework onto the different theoretical approaches presented above, one is able 
to developed the following hypothesis to be testes on the UNASUR case.
 Regional Security Complex Theory
With regards to genesis, according to Buzan and Waever (2003) regional security 
complexes (RSC) are formed from the interplay of the anarchic system (and its security 
consequences), coupled with geographic proximity. They claim geographic proximity is 
imperative as security issues tend to travel more easily over shorter distances (Buzand & 
Waever, 2003). This is particularly true in sectors involved with military, political, societal 
and environmental issues. The interaction between geographic proximity and shared security 
problems means that the relations between states inside the security complex is stronger than 
between states inside the complex and those outside it (Buzan & Waever, 2003). With this in 
mind, the following hypothesis may be derived regarding a region's genesis:
H1: Geographic proximity and shared security problems lead to regionalism.
With regards to functionality, Buzan and Weaver identify two factors influencing a 
particular regional complex, namely the patterns of amity and enmity, and the distribution of 
power within a security complex. Buzan and Waever claim that RSC are defined by durable 
patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of geographic coherent patters of security 
interdependence (Buzan & Waever, 2003). They claim that the specific pattern of who fears 
or likes whom is generated inside the region and dependent on a mixture of history, politics, 
and material conditions. The main assumption is that these patterns and the particular role (of 
friend or foe) assigned to its members, will dominate a system (i.e. Regional Complex) 
sufficiently to determine its overall structure (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The second factor, 
distribution of power, has been well explored in multiple IR theories. It stands that the 
character of a region will be defined by the balance of power within it, be it either unipolar, 
bipolar or multipolar.  Based on these theoretical assumptions, one is able to elaborate the 
following hypotheses:
H2: The patterns of enmity and amity determine the structure of the system.
H3: The distribution of power in a given geographic area determines a region's functionality.
 New Regionalism Approach
As mentioned above, globalization is the core concern in this theoretical approach 
particularly with regards to a region's genesis. The main assumption behind NRA is that 
globalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which results in both positive and negative 
impacts for the concerned countries (Farrell et al, 2005). Regionalism can therefore be seen 
as states' response to globalization and its diverse consequences (Farrell et al, 2005). As 
stated by Mary Farrell, since the world has thus far been unable to create a universal 
governance system with the capacity to manage and regulate relations among nations to a 
degree satisfactory to all, states have turned to other forms of regional governance in order to 
deal with their shared interests and problems (Farrell et al, 2005). Therefore, with regards to 
genesis, the following hypothesis may be formulated:
H4: Globalization, and states' responses to global transformations, lead to Regionalism.
A novel aspect of the New Regionalism Approach is that it does not perceive regions 
as static or given, but instead it interprets them as constructed and re-constructed in the 
process of global transformation. Thus far from static, regions can be seen as open, dynamic 
and apt to change. Another departure from traditional theories is that it views regionalism as 
a more diverse form of integration than other theories, focusing beyond mere economic 
liberalization issues. Finally, it views the process emerging from both below and within the 
region, responding to pressures from a variety of actors, including states, non-state actors, 
organizations and social groupings. Therefore, through this theoretical approach, one is able 
to derive the following hypotheses regarding functionality:
H5: Regionalism is a stop and go process.
H6: Regionalism is dictated by a plurality of actors' interests and pattern of informal 
decision making.
 Post-Hegemonic Regionalism
As mentioned above, PHR is the only of the selected theories developed solely 
focusing on South America. Its initial assumption is that South America is currently 
undergoing a period of transition, where concepts of democracy and development are being 
reinvented as a response to the neo-liberal legacy in the region (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). 
Crucial to this transition is the political shift from right/center-right governments to left/
center-left, marking a “return of the state” to politics of foreign policy, as well as economic 
and social development (Sanahuja, 2012). It views South American regionalism as a rejection 
of the Washington Consensus and seeks to distance itself  from the neoliberal orthodoxy of 
the 1980's and 1990's in favor of a more state-centric approach to combating the 
distributional impacts of globalization (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). Therefore, one can 
hypothesize that:
H7: Concerns over the distributional impact and asymmetries of globalization lead to 
Regionalism.
According to Diana Tussie, the continent-wide shift to the left during the late 1980's 
and early 1990's had a huge impact in the way the region has formed since. The failures of 
neo-liberal orthodoxy to produce any form of sustained and significant social and economic 
development in the region, led the different regionalist projects to actively seek to resist 
further neo-liberalist influence in South America. Furthermore, and in an attempt to actively 
pursue South-South cooperation, greater emphasis was put on a “positive” integration 
agenda, pushing for common institutions and policies particularly in non-trade related areas, 
and specifically in issues significant to the broader region (Sanahuja, 2012). With this in 
mind the following hypothesis may be derived with regards to functionality:
H8: Regionalism focuses on alternatives to neoliberal dominance and issues significant to 
the broader region.
Summary of Hypotheses:
Aspect Security Complex Theory New Regionalism 
Approach 
Post-hegemonic approach
Genesis H1: Geographic proximity 
and shared security problems 
lead to regionalism.
H4: Globalization, and 
states' response to global 
transformation leads to 
regionalism.
H7: Concerns over the 
distributional impact 
and asymmetries of 
Globalization lead to 
regionalism.
Functionality H2: The Patterns of enmity 
and amity determines the 
structure of the system.
H3: The distribution of 
power in a given geographic 
area determines a region's 
functionality.
H5: Regionalism is a stop-
and-go process. 
H6:  Regionalism is 
dictated by a plurality 
of actors' interests and 
patterns of informal 
decision making.
H8: Regionalism focuses on 
alternatives to neoliberal 
dominance and issues 
significant to the broader 
region.
In order to analyze the hypotheses presented above, the thesis will focus on the 
analysis of secondary sources, in particular specific academic articles which apply the 
different theoretical perspectives to the case of UNASUR and the EU. Through Process 
tracing, an analysis will then be carried out to determine whether the assumptions presented 
are correct, as well as to determine the major argumentative gaps in each theoretical 
approach. With the understanding that there are limitations to clearly identifying casual 
mechanisms through process tracing, and in an attempt to reduce dependency on secondary 
sources, the analysis will in turn be complemented with primary sources which support or 
contest the findings. I will analyze the founding documents, as well as conference 
communiques, and statements by regional leaders in order to find clear evidence which 
confirms or disproves the reasoning and explanatory power of each theoretical approach.  
Finally, the regionalism processes of South America and Europe will be compared in order to 
determine the uniqueness and similarities of their regional security formation, and the extent 
to which the insights of each theoretical perspective can be transferred between regions.
5. Analysis
RSCT
With Regards to Genesis, Buzan and Waever claim physical adjacency tends to 
generate greater patterns of security interaction because security issues tend to travel more 
easily over shorter distances (Buzan & Waever, 2003). When one applies the variables of 
hypothesis 1 to UNASUR, one can immediately tell that the geographic aspect is fulfilled. 
UNASUR's borders perfectly encompass all of South America, with the exception of French 
Guiana, which still remains a French territory and thus part of the EU. This was not always 
the case however, and as earlier described, the continent was historically fragment into 
several different regional projects, with most states pursuing their own bilateral trade 
agreements with countries of the region and beyond. Understanding why this fragmented 
region finally decided to increase cooperation and ultimately created a continent-wide 
security complex, requires one to understand their shared security concerns. Buzan and 
Waever identify three levels in which the security concerns of South American nations 
interact sufficiently so as to warrant security sector regionalism; these include domestic, 
regional, and inter-regional/global levels (Buzan & Waever, 2003). 
At the domestic level, one of the issues of greatest concern to all states in the region 
relates to the preservation of democratic institutions. South America has had a troublesome 
history with democratic rule, with virtually all countries in the region having experienced a 
period of autocratic rule. This was particularly pronounced after the end of World War Two, 
where Cold War dynamics and the fear of the spread of communism lead to the American 
support of right-wing military leaders in many of the countries (Hurrell, 1998). With the 
advent of democratization in the region during the late 1980's, the new ruling elite of South 
America was determined to ensure that democracy in the region, which remained fragile, was 
protected. The promotion and protection of democracy has now become one of the pillars of 
South American regionalism and can be seen as crucial to the formation of the regional 
security complex. UNASUR's emphasis on the protection of democracy can be explicitly 
found in its constitutive treaty, which states that: “South American integration and union are 
based on the guiding principles of […] democracy, citizen participation and pluralism” 
(UNASUR, 2008a). 
The democratic credentials of the regional bloc were tested for the first time in 2010, 
when disgruntled members of the police force in Ecuador kidnapped President Rafael Correa 
in an apparent coup attempt (MercoPress, 2010). The heads of states of all member states 
subsequently convened an emergency session in Buenos Aires, in which strong support for 
Correa was voiced. Bolivian president Evo Morales stated at the end of the summit that: 
“from UNASUR we are going to defend democracy in Ecuador, this is a provocation for the 
whole of South America” (MercoPress, 2010). As a result of this apparent coup attempt, 
UNASUR introduced a further Democracy Clause to its constituent treaty, specifying 
measures to be taken in case of coups, including suspension of membership. This democracy 
clause was once again used in 2012, when President Lugo of Paraguay was ousted from 
government after a badly managed standoff with landless farmers left 17 people dead. In 
condemnation of the hastily carried out impeachment, UNASUR suspended Paraguay's 
membership to the organization, demonstrating the importance of democracy for the region, 
and the willingness of the bloc to act united on the issue (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 
2012).
Another important issue of domestic concern for the countries in the region relates to 
the influence of the military. The end of military dictatorship in the region, particularly in the 
southern cone, resulted in very different outcomes and roles for the military (Buzan and 
Waever, 2003). While in Brazil and Chile, the military managed to secure a position for itself 
after the transition to democracy, in Argentina, it was completely discredited due to its many 
political failures, such as the Malvinas/Falkland war (Buzan and Waever, 2003). According 
to Buzan and Waever, a weakened military can enable change in foreign policy and can 
lower levels of tension in a region. However, in South America, while the military has seen 
its power dwindle, some countries still possess very strong military sectors, potentially 
threatening the stability of the region. This is particularly the case for countries like 
Colombia, whose fight against narco-traffickers and FARC militants has inevitably lead to a 
more significant influence from the military, as well as close security cooperation with the 
United States.  In an effort to decrease suspicion among its members, and reduce military 
influence in the foreign policy-making of the region, UNASUR established the Center for 
Strategic Defense Studies (CEED), with the aim of increasing transparency as well as 
developing a cohesive response to foreign affairs. The center works as a think tank on issues 
of regional security and works to facilitate information and staff exchange between the 
different member states. It also seeks to compile detailed information on members' military 
spending, in the hopes of increasing transparency and diffusing tension (CEED, 2013). In its 
inaugural conference, CEED's director, Alfredo Forti, highlighted the significance of the 
center for South American security by stating that the CEED is “about the endogenous 
construction of strategic thinking oriented from the specific needs and common interests of 
our countries, functional to the regional interest based on the needs and goals of all South 
American states” (CEED, 2011).
At a regional level, one of the biggest shared security concerns among UNASUR's 
members relates to paramilitary groups operating unrestrained in the region (Sanahuja, 2012). 
These groups, ranging from Marxist revolutionaries to international drug cartels, have been 
able to operate in the region almost unimpeded due to South America's vast and inaccessible 
rainforest territories. The vastness and density of the forest cover means that the borders 
between the many countries are extremely porous allowing armed militia to move between 
them evading capture. The inability of individual countries to deal with these groups, which 
are often better equipped and able to buy off local law enforcement, meant that tackling them 
alone would be an enormous and potentially futile task. Colombia, Bolivia and Peru are 
particularly vulnerable to this problem, with the dynamics drug production threatening to 
destabilize and fragment these countries (Buzan & Waever, 2003). This has ultimately 
invited an ever increasing involvement from the US in the region with its controversial “war 
on drugs”, which has caused immense bloodshed and produced very little results (Sanahuja, 
2012). In the face of an ever escalating situation, it was clear that this problem needed a 
regional solution based on increased cooperation between the several law enforcement 
sectors of the member states.  As a result, UNASUR has devoted considerable resources as 
well as two institutions explicitly dealing with this task. In highlighting the significance of 
the drug problem for the region's security, former UANSUR secretary general Maria Emma 
Mejia, stated that the drug problem “is like a plague, it's something which corrupts, which 
damages our democratic institutions, wiping out generations” (Martins, 2012). She further 
stressed the importance of acting internationally on the issue, as consumer countries need to 
also bare responsibility for the problem (Martins, 2012). While the success of this 
cooperation still remains to be seen, it is certainly a positive step in demonstrating 
UNASUR's willingness to produce a local solution to the problem.
Finally at the inter-regional/global level, a shared concern of many states in the region 
relates to the changing relationship with the United States, in particular the regional 
interpretation that the historical presence of the United States in South America has been 
mainly negative. During the Cold War, the United States placed great security importance on 
the region in its attempt to halt the spread of communism. As a result, America was involved 
in questionable actions including granting its support to coup d’états and right-wing military 
governments (Hurrell, 1998). Such actions had a detrimental impact on the American image 
in the region, and soon the OAS began to be viewed increasingly as a mere tool of 
Washington to exert its will in South America. With the end of the Cold War, however, the 
US relationship with South America began to change, largely as a result of changing 
American priorities. US security focus soon shifted to Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East, while its interests in South America shifted towards social and economic issues (Buzan 
& Waever, 2003). This shift thus forced South America to pursue an alternative solution to 
its security needs. As both MERCOSUR and CAN began to deliver institutional results and 
economic security, it soon became a logical step to expand its success across the region, and 
across different sectors, providing the stepping stone for the formation of UNASUR and a 
continent-wide security complex. Thus, through an analysis of UNASUR as a geographically 
contingent complex, with shared security concerns at the domestic, regional and global level, 
one is able to find evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 of RSCT. Having established its 
genesis, one can now turn the attention to the functionality of the region.
With Regards to functionality, Buzan and Waever, in their book “Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis” (1998), explained how the internal dynamics of a RSC is located 
along a spectrum ranging from conflict formation, to security regimes, to security 
communities (Buzan & Waever, 1998). The dynamics along this spectrum are defined by the 
patterns of amenity and enmity among the member states. On the negative end of the 
spectrum lies conflict formation, in which interdependence among the states arises from 
“fear, rivalry and mutual perceptions of threat” (Buzan & Waever, 1998). In the middle of the 
spectrum lie security regimes, in which states still perceive each other as potential threats, 
however, have made significant arrangements “in order to reduce the security dilemma 
among them” (Buzan & Waever, 1998). And finally, at the positive end of the spectrum lies 
security communities, in which the states no longer expect, or prepare to use force against 
each other, thus making a conflict between them unthinkable. In order to evaluate the validity 
of hypothesis 2 with regards to the functionality of UNASUR, it is therefore, important to 
identify how these patterns amity and enmity have influenced the functionality of the bloc.
Throughout most of its history, South America found itself as a conflict formation 
RSC (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The effects of decolonization, and the eventual dynamics of 
the Cold War, meant that South American states suffered from many domestic 
vulnerabilities, weak interstate dynamics and regular interference from outside powers 
(primarily the United States). With the successful formation and institutionalization of CAN 
and MERCOSUR, however, the region soon began to move along the spectrum towards a 
security regime. What allowed for this transformation is the increased interaction among the 
states driven partially by domestic political change, but also increased interaction capacity 
due to the development of the local economies. Both CAN and MERCOSUR placed great 
emphasis on economic integration as a way of promoting development as well as security 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003). This approach was based on the liberal tradition that increased 
economic integration promotes security by impacting the material incentive for conflict, as 
well as pressing governments towards new forms of institutionalized cooperation (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003). With its focus on economic integration, both CAN and MERCOSUR 
surprised many critics by surviving the economic crisis of the 1990's, which many thought 
would result in a return to hostilities among its member states. As the economies in these 
blocs began to flourish in the early 2000's its members sought to increase cooperation, and in 
turn spread economic interdependence and security to the entire continent, creating what is 
often refer to as “South America as a zone of peace” (Buzan & Waever, 2003). While the 
initial institutionalization efforts of UNASUR focused primarily on merging both CAN and 
MERCOSUR with a minimum level of institutional duplication, reoccurring patterns of 
enmity highlighted the need for more specific security components (Buzan & Waever, 2003). 
In 2008, the Colombian army launched a clandestine operation inside Ecuadorian territory 
which ultimately resulted in the death of 20 FARC members including its number two, Raul 
Reys (COHA, 2009). Understandably, this situation caused a huge diplomatic crisis in the 
region, resulting in both Ecuador and Venezuela cutting ties with Colombia. While intense 
negotiations and continent-wide condemnation of Colombia's actions eventually brought the 
crisis under control, deep enmity between these countries remained (COHA, 2009). Brazilian 
President Lula saw this ongoing tension as an opportunity to promote further cooperation in 
the region and thus pushed to “create a defensive entity that would cultivate regional peace 
by promoting conflict resolution methods by means of a military-to-military communication 
networks” (COHA, 2009).  Lula's efforts eventually led to the creation of the South American 
Defense Council (CDS) as a “mechanism of integration, dialogue and cooperation” among 
the South American countries. 
As demonstrated above, the South American RSC has slowly been evolving from 
conflict formation, towards a security community through reoccurring patterns of amity and 
enmity, which repeatedly presented the need for further security integration. Whether or not 
South America now constitutes a full blown security community, in which the use of force 
between its members is unthinkable, remains to be seen. However, the determination of the 
regional leaders to foster a regional conflict resolution forum, as demonstrated by the creation 
of the CDS, seems to be a step in the right direction. Through this analysis one is thus able to 
find evidence in support of hypotheses 2 of RSCT that pattern of amity and enmity 
determines the structure and function of the system. 
Buzan and Waever highlight a further dynamic which determines a region’s 
functionality, namely the distribution of power in a given geographic area. With regards to 
the balance of power Buzan and Waever identify two distinct types of RSCs: standard and 
centered. The main difference between them is the presence, or lack thereof, of a global 
power in the security complex. They claim that “standard” RSCs do not contain a global 
power, and thus clear distinctions can be drawn between regional level dynamics, and 
intervening global level ones (Buzan & Waever, 2003). They further claim that South 
America is a clear example of a standard RSC, where the United States, as a global power, 
penetrates the region sporadically but is not itself part of the security complex (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003). Within a standard RSC the main element of security politics is the 
distribution of power inside the region, and how this distribution set the terms for the minor 
powers and influence from outside forces (Buzan & Waever, 2003).  Therefore, in order to 
test the validity of hypothesis 3 with regards to UNASUR's functionality, one must 
understand the distribution of power within the bloc.
With relation to UNASUR, the role of Brazil as the sole and undisputed regional 
leader goes a long way to explain the formation and functionality of this regional bloc. The 
sheer size of Brazil's geography, economy and population, coupled with its rapid economic 
expansion in the last 10 years, has pushed the Brazilian government to pursue greater 
international influence both regionally and globally. Unlike some of its neighbors, Brazil 
seems ready to pursue a more global role in politics; however, it has also recognized that it is 
unlikely to achieve its international potential without securing its boarders and ensuring 
regional stability (COHA, 2010). With this understanding, the Lula administration committed 
significant economic and diplomatic resources to ensuring the success of regional integration 
(COHA, 2010). Lula was particularly successful at forging good relations with the many 
leaders of the region, from left governments of Bolivia and Venezuela, to the right-leaning 
and American allies, like Colombia. Lula's uncanny ability for forging good relations 
between the many political factions allowed him to push for further integration of the 
continent, placing Brazil as a crucial facilitator for regional cooperation, and further 
entrenching it as the sole regional power (COHA, 2010). Furthermore, Brazil's desire to 
create a continent wide bloc can be seen as an attempt to limit American influence in the 
region. While the US is not a direct member of the South American security complex, its role 
as a global superpower means that it has the ability to penetrate and influence regional 
relations. Challenging the historical influence of the US, Latin American governments are 
now aligning closer to Brazilian interests, who in turn are pushing for a dynamic and 
independent foreign policy which significantly differs from the Washington perspective 
(COHA, 2012b). By promoting a regional bloc without the presence of the United States, 
Brazil is able to consolidate its influence on the institutions and members of UNASUR, 
which in turn allows it to promote its leadership on the global stage. The analysis above helps 
support hypothesis 3 that the distribution of power in a given geographic area determines a 
region's functionality. Brazil’s dominance in the region and its determination to exert greater 
influence in the global stage meant that it has spend significant resources ensuring UNASUR 
thrives as a regional organization, without which the bloc would have likely gone the way of 
previous regionalisation projects in South America, and fizzled in time.
Despite providing some crucial insights with regards to UNASUR's genesis and 
functionality, RSCT has some important limitations, which highlight the necessity for 
alternative theoretical perspectives. One of the major criticisms that can be levied on this 
theory is the focus on traditional security issues at the detriment of new security challenges 
derived from globalization. No longer are security issues defined solely on military and 
border disputes. Increasingly issues such as the environment, health as well as social 
developments, are playing a crucial role in the security considerations of countries. These 
new concerns, unlike traditional security issues, are not as geographically limited as 
hypothesis 1 would suggest. While Buzan and Waever distinguish between national, regional 
and intra-regional/global levels, the security concerns are discussed in how they play out at 
the regional level alone. Another issue with this theoretical approach is it focuses solely on 
the role of the state in pushing for regionalism, often at the detriment of non-state actors. The 
role of a South American identity, and indigenous cultures, particularly in the formation of 
CAN, has largely been ignored in favored of more direct security interdependence. 
Furthermore, the role of non-state actors such as international drug cartels and FARC in 
promoting the need for securitization has much more global implications than presented here. 
For these reasons, it is important to consider a theoretical approach in which the impacts of 
globalization can take a more centered role.
 NRA
As previously mentioned, the New Regionalism Approach makes a clear distinction 
between the old regionalism of the 1960's and 1970's and the new regionalism, which began 
to emerge in South America in the late 1980's and 1990's. In the New Regionalism Approach, 
regions are not simply regarded as 'given' formal organizations but, instead, are understood to 
be much more open and dynamic, being constructed and reconstructed in the process of 
global transformation (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). Globalization, thus, is a key aspect of this 
theoretical approach, where the dynamics of globalization can be seen to erode the 
sovereignty and authority of the Westphalian State system (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). In 
response to this erosion, as highlighted by hypothesis 4, governments came to view regional 
cooperation as a crucial way in which to strengthen their sovereignty and respond to this 
global transformation (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). Furthermore, while old regionalism was 
understood to be economically protectionist as well as function specific, in NRA, it is seen as 
economically open and promoting of trade liberalization. This open and multipurpose form of 
regionalism can be clearly identified in the formation of both MERCOSUR and CAN. 
Economically speaking, both MERCOSUR and CAN were created with the ultimate aim of 
forming a free trade zone among its members and increasing economic cooperation and 
interdependence. Furthermore, they departed from previous regionalism attempts by 
expanding the integration agenda to include areas which were increasingly being defined 
as 'common interests' due to the globalization process. 
With regards to security, Old Regionalism was traditionally dependent on superpower 
patronage (Hettne, 2008). For South America, this meant a US-led regional security approach 
aimed at sustaining the military alliances and balances of power of a unipolar world, 
ultimately resulting in subordinate relations with the United States (Hettne, 2009). In new 
regionalism, however, the emergence of global threats, the erosion of borders, and the 
increased role and importance of non-state actors, meant that states no longer had the 
capacity to deal with security challenges alone. South America responded to the dynamics of 
this global transformation by pursuing a broader integration agenda aimed at improving 
South America's international standing as well as reinforcing its internal governance 
capacities (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). In order to analyze hypothesis 4, and understand how 
globalization and state's response to global transformation impact the formation of 
UNASUR, one must identify the most pressing globalization challenges being faced by the 
region.
Environmental issues play a crucial role in the South American security concerns, not 
least as it is home to what is often considered the lungs of the world, the Amazon Rainforest. 
For decades, the excessive focus on Cold War politics and the inability of the international 
community to create an effective collective security system meant that issues, such as poverty 
alleviation and environmental concerns, were often downgraded or ignored (Brauch, 2008). 
This lack of environmental mitigation, coupled with increased resource extraction and 
economic growth based on fossil fuels, has had an insurmountable impact in the South 
America's environment (Brauch, 2008). The consequent loss in bio-diversity as well as the 
impact of global warming has resulted in security concerns related to increased and 
uncontrolled urban migration, and illegal immigration (Brauch, 2008). Furthermore, 
international skepticism that the regional governments will be able to reduce the rate of 
deforestation, has lead to calls for the internationalization of the Amazon to protect it for 
future generations (Barrionuevo, 2008). Needless to say, this has not been welcomed in the 
region, with the ruling elite interpreting it as a clear intrusion of its national sovereignty 
(Barrionuevo, 2008). As a result of these quickly developing security issues, UNASUR 
placed great importance on the environment, particularly to protect it from outside 
intervention. Environmental protection and the sustainable use of resources take center role 
in the organization, being listed in the constituent treaty as one of the organization's main 
areas of concern (UNASUR, 2008a). Further cooperation in the area of monitoring, 
enforcement and technology has also been promoted to ensure the reduction of illicit resource 
extraction and environmental impact. Evidence for this can be found in the communiqué of 
the recently convened “Conference on Natural Resource”, which stressed technological 
advancements as imperative to minimizing the environmental impact of resource extraction 
(UNASUR 2013). 
Another significant implication of globalization in the security considerations of 
South America, relates to the erosion of national borders and the increasing mobility of 
people and activities. Mention already has been made to the dynamics of the illegal drug 
trade in the region, which has ultimately lead to the construction of a global network whose 
impact goes beyond the national jurisdictions and reach of national law-enforcement agencies 
(Farrel, 2005). Unilateral efforts to tackle the problem have often lead to tension among its 
members. Brazil's militarization of its borders in an effort to combat the drug trade for 
example, was met with skepticism by its neighbors, and confidence building measures were 
needed to ensure tensions did not escalate (Hettne, 2008). Another security concern 
stemming from the the erosion of borders, relates to the increase levels of illegal immigrants 
into the region. After a decade of economic growth, South America is increasingly being 
perceived as a region of opportunity. As a result, the number of economic migrants has 
skyrocketed (BBC, 2013). Immigrants from Haiti, Central America and as far afield as Africa 
and Bangladesh have began pouring into the region (particularly Brazil), traveling almost 
undetected through the rainforest (BBC, 2013). As a result, UNASUR has committed 
significant resources to ensuring information exchange between the states, and that border 
controls and the migration of the South American labor force is regulated. 
Through an analysis of the globalization's impact in the formation of UNASUR, one 
is able to conclude that, at face value, the NRA approach provides valuable insights as to the 
genesis of the bloc. However, upon closer examination, its insistence on neoliberal economic 
openness, as a driver of regionalisation is not consistent with the South American experience, 
particularly since the bloc-wide shift to the left during the early 2000's. This neoliberal 
economic openness, often referred to as “open regionalism”, essentially relies on the 
alignment of economic integration with liberal policies of the so called Washington 
consensus (Sanahuja, 2012). It emphasizes that integration projects should avoid protectionist 
measures and should form part of the ongoing globalization and internationalization process 
of the world political economy (Warleigh-Lack, 2011). In some ways, “open regionalism” 
can be seen to have developed in South America after the end of the Cold War, especially 
with the formation of CAN and MERCOSUR, which placed great emphasis on trade 
liberalization. However, by the mid-2000's its influence had already begun to wane due to the 
inherent limitations of the liberalization strategy and the outright rejection of the neoliberal 
principles by the recently established leftist governments (Sanahuja, 2012). The formation of 
UNASUR, and in particular its security sector integration, therefore, coincides with a post-
liberal, or post-hegemonic political period in South America. The implications of this shift 
will be further discussed by the PHR theory.
With regards to functionality, one of the novel contributions of the NRA is 
that it views regionalism as a stop and go process. In other words, far from being static, 
regionalism can be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed as a response to global 
transformations (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). Unlike RSCT, regionalism is not be solely 
defined by geographic contingent borders, but instead will deepen and expand as a response 
to the transformations in the global system (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). Through an analysis 
of UNASUR, one can see that such insight is nicely reflected in the formation of the bloc. As 
mentioned earlier, the process of regionalisation in South America has gone through several 
incarnations, with multiple organizations, often with overlapping goals and membership. A 
clear example of this is the FTAA eventual development into the Andean Group, which in 
turn eventually developed into the CAN. Similarity, MERCOSUR saw its levels of 
cooperation and integration fluctuate over the years, with twin institutional crisis hitting the 
organization in 1998 and 2001, as a result of an economic downturn (Sanahuja, 2010. The 
causes of this stop and go process are varied, however,  pushes for higher integration and 
institutionalization often coincided with  periods of economic growth, while periods of 
regional deconstruction were often associated with a lack of economic complementarity, 
deficiencies in physical integration, macroeconomic instabilities, as well as unilateral 
responses to crises (Sanahuja, 2010). Thus, a valuable insight that may be derived from 
hypothesis 5 is that the level of security regionalism achieved thus far under UANSUR is far 
from guaranteed. Future economic and security developments related to globalization may 
well produce further regional integration, perhaps encompassing the broader region leading 
to the further institutionalization of CELAC. On the other hand, internal conflicts between 
the member stats, and particularly deficiencies in policy integration, may well lead to the 
brake up of the regional block, in favor of bilateral agreements, and unilateral actions. 
Determining which direction the region will take however, is highly problematic, not least 
because of the uncertainties associated with globalization. Thus partial evidence may be 
found in support of hypothesis 5 in which UNASUR's development is viewed a stop and go 
process; however no deterministic claims can be made as to its future shape and functionality.
A second insight provided by NRA with regards to the functionality of a region 
relates to the plurality of actors' interests involved in the formation of the region. It departs 
from the “old”, realist, assumption that regionalism is dictated by the internal dynamics of the 
member states, and in which the state was the primary actor. Instead it promotes the 
understanding that regionalism resulted from a more comprehensive, multidimensional 
societal process, where the prevalence of non-state actors are emphasized (Warleigh-Lack, 
2006). NRA, therefore, is much more pluralistic in relation to the scope of potential actors 
driving regionalism. According to Söderbaum: “Regionalism is understood as a 
heterogeneous, comprehensive, multidimensional phenomenon, manifesting itself across a 
variety of sectors and 'pushed', or constructed, by a variety of state, market, society, and 
external actors both within and outside formal regional organizations” (Warleigh-Lack et al, 
2011). While providing similar insight as neofunctionalism, NRA goes a step beyond by 
allowing for an even broader consideration with regards to which actors and issues are 
involved in the construction of the region. Therefore, in order to understand the current 
functionality of UNASUR, it is important to consider which other actors, aside from the state, 
have been involved in its regionalisation effort.
The role of indigenous communities and identity has played a significant role in the 
formation of South American regional projects. They are understood to be rooted in an 
indigenous cosmo-vision dating back to the previous South American empires such as the 
Incas, and can still be seen to play an important role in the social struggle, particularly in 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru (Spring, 2008). Like most regions, the South American indigenous 
population had a painful and bloody experience with colonialism. Their population and social 
system were decimated starting in 1492 with the integration of their territory into a foreign 
social system (Spring, 2008). Forced labor, diseases and outright massacres, decimated the 
population destroying much of their social fabric. Indigenous culture was further supplanted 
with the importation of African slaves to replace the quickly declining indigenous labor. 
Globalization and economic development further impacted indigenous populations, as 
commodity extraction, resource depletion as well as water and land pollution, increasingly 
forced the urbanization of indigenous group, pushing them to the periphery of social 
inclusion (Spring, 2008). In the face of social nonconformity and perceived injustices, the 
indigenous groups have increasingly organized in demand of better social equity, often 
leading to violent protests. The indigenous movement gained renewed strength with the 
election of Evo Morales in Bolivia who promised to focus his administration in improving 
the conditions of the indigenous population and traditional coca production. Thus, the 
indigenous identity played a significant role in the formation of CAN by creating a shared 
identity and impetus to resolve a common problem. South American regionalisation, 
therefore, can be seen as an effort by indigenous groups to protect their identity and 
guarantee their survival and better participation in society.
Another non-state actor influencing the regional integration effort has already been 
well discussed in this paper. Paramilitary organizations such as the FARC and drug cartels 
play a significant role in the security regionalisation by providing an incentive and 
motivation for the member states countries to cooperate. Interestingly however, these groups 
have at times also tried to use UNASUR in a bid to gain some political legitimacy. FARC has 
twice attempted to reach out to UNASUR, asking member states to allow them to lay out 
their vision for the resolution of the Colombian conflict, as well as requesting its status be 
changed from a “terrorist organization” to a “belligerent force” (WashingtonTimes, 2008). In 
both instances however, its request were shut down by the member states signaling that the 
ruling elite would not allow for UNASUR to be hijacked by non-state belligerent forces.
While the influence of non-state actors is certainly there for the formation of 
UNASUR, the extent to which they influence the decision-making, and institutionalization of 
the bloc is highly debatable, which in turns brings to question the entire theoretical approach 
with regards to its understanding of UNASUR regionalisation. Hypothesis 6 emphasizes 
informal regionalism from below, taking into account informal regional interactions and the 
incorporation of a wide range of non-state actors. The problem is that the approach tends to 
swing too far from theories that focus on state-led regionalism (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). 
Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of South American integration is that it is 
inherently state-led, reacting to, and depending on, state strategies. The role and influence of 
civil societies in South America is extremely limited  due to “persistent institutional barriers 
to inclusion, the practical obstacles for many groups of scaling up to the regional/
transnational level, and the particular difficulties associated with accessing negotiations” 
(Malamud, 2010). Others claim that the lack of influence from civil societies in the 
regionalisation efforts stems less from a lack of access than from a lack of interest (Malamud, 
2010). They claim that, unlike the EU, the perceived irrelevance of the South American effort 
discourages social participation (Malamud, 2010). Instead, South American integration 
efforts can be seen as a form of interpresidentialism, in which the presidents have a dominant 
role in agenda-setting and political will of the organization (Hummel & Lohaus, 2012). The 
successful formation of UNASUR, and to a large extent MERCOSUR and CAN, can be seen 
as the result of intense initiative on the part of the presidents, through their executive 
preferences and political entrepreneurship (Hummel & Lohaus, 2012). Therefore, with 
regards to hypothesis 6, while civil societies can be seen to have played some role in the 
security regionalisation of South America by providing incentives and a shared identity, its 
role has been rather limited, with the bulk of the regionalist effort stemming from the state. 
We can now turn our analysis to the third and final theoretical approach; Post Hegemonic 
Regionalism.
 PHR
PHR theory emerged as a response to the inability of the new regionalism theories to 
provide an accurate explanation of regional integration in South America. According to Pia 
Rigorrozi, New Regionalists tended to overstate the role of non-state actors in the 
regionalisation process which in South America tended to be weak and when present, under 
the coordination of state agencies (Rigozzi, 2011). Furthermore, its aforementioned focus on 
liberalization no longer held true in a continent which had experienced a significant political 
shift to the left. Accordingly, hypothesis 7 of PHR views the genesis of UNASUR stemming 
from concerns over the distributional impact and asymmetries of globalization. Central to the 
regional response to these asymmetries are three key issues: The political shift to the left and 
their response to the social conditions of the region, the recent rise of the South, as and the 
decline of the American hegemony.
One of the most significant developments contributing to a post hegemonic region-
building in South America, has been the political shift to the left in the early 2000's, which 
became infamously known as the “Pink Tide” (BBC, 2005). Neoliberal economic programs 
have had a troubling history in the region. During the 1980's and 1990's, global capitalism 
swept over South America bringing in an era of unprecedented economic and social change 
(Robinson, 2011). Privatization, deregulation, government bonds, and untapped markets, 
brought a wave of foreign investment into the region (Robinson, 2011). This economic 
revolution soon created a new strata in society of transnationally oriented capitalist elites, to 
whom globalization opened a new era of mobility and global economic participation 
(Robinson, 2011). These neoliberal programmes, however, also brought about unprecedented 
levels of poverty,  mass unemployment, huge inequalities, as well as the “immiseration and 
displacement of tens if not hundreds of millions from the popular classes, which triggered a 
wave of transnational migration and [...] mass mobilization among those who stayed behind”, 
in turn impacting the region's security (Robinson, 2011). The 2000-2001 economic downturn 
in the region eventually proved to be the tipping point for neoliberal ideology in South 
America. Argentina, which had long been considered the “poster child” for neoliberalism in 
the region, soon saw its economy collapse, and mass uprising eventually led to the election of 
left leaning Nestor Kirchner (Robinson, 2011). By the mid-2000's three quarters of the South 
American population were being ruled by left leaning presidents (BBC, 2005). These new 
presidents challenged, and even reversed many of the neoliberal policies which had been 
implemented by their predecessors, seeking to halt privatization, nationalize natural 
resources, and restore public health and education (Robinson, 2011). Crucially, they also 
sought foreign policies independent to those of Washington, particularly focusing on closer 
relations with other developing nations. Needless to say, such measures proved immensely 
popular, particularly to the disenfranchised portion of the population, and also signaled South 
America's intention to pursuit its own unique approach to economic and social development. 
Neoliberalism and globalization thus became synonymous, and both represented the latest 
expression of the ever-present threat of imperialism and foreign intervention (Sanahuja, 
2012).
The shift to the left coincided with another significant period in South American 
history, namely the rise of the South. In the mid-2000's, as the “Pink Tide” had swept over 
most of South America, the continent begun to experience unprecedented levels of growth, 
largely driven by the boom in the commodity markets (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). The 
South American economies began to expand quickly, largely dependent on exports to China, 
as well as the opening up of new markets in East Asia, Africa and Latin America (Riggirozzi 
& Tussie, 2012). Brazil, in particular, experienced remarkable levels of growth to its already 
large economy, and soon its global ambitions, which had been dormant since its last period of 
economic growth, was brought to the fore. Therefore, as stated by Jose Sanahuja, UNASUR 
can be largely seen as the result of Brazilian geopolitical designs (Sanahuja, 2012). Its 
formation responded to two constants in its foreign policy: the desire for autonomy, and the 
desire to become a regional and global power (Sanahuja, 2012). By giving Latin American 
regional integration a South American frame and narrative, Brazil sought to remove Mexico 
and the US from the equation, and guarantee itself as the sole power in the region (Sanahuja, 
2012). At the same time, Brazilian president Lula also embarked in an ambitious diplomatic 
project to increase South-South cooperation and development across the globe, which 
resulted in increased cooperation with Africa, as well as the formation of forums such as the 
BRICS, with fellow emerging markets Russia, India, China and South Africa. By 
institutionalizing South-South relations, Brazil is attempting to guarantee itself as the natural 
leader of the developing world, with UNASUR as its inherent sphere of influence.
Finally, this so called rise of the South also coincided with an important event, namely 
the decline of American hegemony in the region. As previously mentioned, from the end of 
the Cold War, American interest in the region began to wane, as it no longer viewed 
containment of communism as a crucial foreign policy goal. Furthermore, with the advent of 
9/11, the United States began to shift its focus towards the Middle East, Africa and Asia, as it 
did not perceive any significant terrorist threats emanating from the region. Its focus on Iraq 
and Afghanistan soon left a political vacuum that was quickly filled by regional leaders and 
projects that sought to reject the Bush-era unilateralism, while at the same time using it as a 
justification to their aspirations of autonomy (Rigozzi, 2011). 
The South American response to the asymmetries of globalization, therefore, took 
place in the face of these changing dynamics in the politics of the continent, where the region 
can be seen to have entered a post-liberal, or post-hegemonic period. The political shift to the 
left under the “Pink Tide”, was crucial for creating a new momentum towards the 
establishment of UNASUR. This was further promoted by the desire to break from the 
neoliberal influence and create a security agreement free from American hegemonic 
influence. Through this analysis one is thus able to find strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis 7, that concerns over the distributional impact and asymmetries of globalization 
lead to regionalism.
The asymmetries created by globalization, and the political shift to the left in South 
America, did not only impact the genesis of the UNASUR, but it also greatly influenced the 
region's functionality. In its desire to implement policies that distanced themselves from 
those of neoliberalism and open regionalism, UNASUR has pursued an open agenda for 
integration, which goes beyond traditional issues of security in order to incorporate, 
economic, energy, social and environmental security (Sanahuja, 2012). These policies in 
many ways represent a return of the state to politics of security and social development, in a 
world where market forces and private actors dominate the neoliberal economic system 
(Sanahuja, 2012).  Much of the security focus of UNASUR has been based on the assertion 
that the many security problems facing the region are rooted on social issues, and that their 
solution cannot be found solely with the military (Sanahuja, 2012). As a result, significant 
focus has been put into social development, as can be illustrated by the formation of sectoral 
councils dealing with the issue, and most importantly by the creation of the Bank of the 
South (Sanahuja, 2012). The Bank of the South resulted from the desire of the member states 
to find alternative forms of economic assistance than those offered by the IMF and World 
Bank (Lendman, 2007). South America has a complicated history with these organizations, 
particularly during the 1980's and 1990's, when the conditionalities imposed on them for 
monetary assistance were found to produce greater social pressures and economic insecurities 
(Lendman, 2007). As stated by Chavez during the announcement of the Bank: South America 
“will no longer have to go to Washington nor to the IMF nor to the World Bank, not to 
anyone”, clearly illustrating the desire to distance the region from these organizations 
(Lendman, 2007). Its creation, therefore, can be seen as an attempt by UNASUR to take 
control of its economic security, through alternatives to the neoliberal dominated 
international financial organizations, thus providing strong evidence in support of hypothesis 
8.
Another way in which the post-hegemonic movement has impacted the functionality 
of the region, is UNASUR insistence on the intergovernmental character of the bloc and the 
primacy of sovereignty (Rigozzi, 2011). This can be seen as the result of the tumultuous 
history South America has had with foreign intervention in its domestic affairs. Aversion 
towards foreign intervention is reflected in the constitutive treaty of the block, which 
determines that all decision in the block must be made through consensus (UNASUR, 
2008a). This insistence on unanimity can be seen as a way to ensure that the principles of 
sovereignty and self-determination are respected by all member states. A further provision 
safeguarding territorial sovereignty can be found in the constituent treaty of the Defense 
Council, which states the body will function with the “unconditional respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of non intervention in states' affairs” 
(UNASUR, 2008b). 
The importance placed on sovereignty and non-intervention can also be seen as way 
to prevent one of the biggest perceived threats to the region, namely the spread of American 
influence and dominance. Traditionally, America has had a detrimental impact in the region's 
security, and was often perceived to have direct interests in the region's instabilities (as was 
the case with the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador, as well as political instabilities in 
Venezuela) (Sanahuja, 2012). As a result, greater autonomy from outside influence was 
desired, and alternatives to the hegemon-controlled OAS were pursued. This helps explain 
the significant diplomatic resources were committed to ensuring the formation of UNASUR, 
and most importantly the formation of a regional security body in which the United States 
played no part.  Through an analysis of the influence of the post-hegemonic movement in the 
functionality of UNASUR, one is able thus to find further evidence in support of  hypothesis 
8, that Regionalism focuses on alternatives to neoliberal dominance, and issues transversal to 
the region. 
Despite being the only theoretical approach to be entirely conceived in order to 
explain the regionalisation process taking place in South America, Post-hegemonic 
regionalism is not without its criticisms. One of the biggest problems with this theory relates 
to the post-hegemonic identity and the pursuit of alternatives to neoliberalism which, 
according to hypothesis 8, is crucial for the formation of the region. The advent of the “Pink 
Tide” in South America, allowed the member governments to align the policy goals for the 
region. However, there are now increasing signs that the “Pink Tide”, and the alternatives to 
neoliberalism it promotes, is now receding. Despite having fared comparatively well during 
the global economic crisis, the lingering impacts of the global slowdown are beginning to 
take its toll on the region. Public support for the leftist government has begun to wane, as the 
social policies implemented are no longer producing the same results as during the boom 
years of the early to mid 2000's (Robinson, 2011). The impact of the economic downturn is 
further exacerbated by the loss of crucial players in the post-hegemonic movement of the 
region. During the early periods of regional integration under UNASUR, the regional block 
benefited greatly from the diplomatic efforts of two of South America's most influential 
leaders, namely President Lula of Brazil and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. President Lula 
ended his two terms as President of Brazil in 2011 by securing the election of his protégée 
Dilma Rousseff. Unfortunately, unlike her predecessor, Dilma does not posses the political 
savvy and charisma of her predecessor, who was able to forge consensus and good relations 
among almost all sides of the political spectrum (CoHA, 2010). Furthermore, since her 
election, President Dilma has been forced to focus most of her attention of domestic 
economic issues, often at the detriment of furthering security cooperation among the 
members of UNASUR (CoHA, 2010). But perhaps most significantly, the post hegemonic 
movement in South America suffered its greatest blow with the death of President Hugo 
Chavez of Venezuela in March 2013. While often considered a controversial figure, Chavez 
was critical for promoting greater autonomy from the United States as well as alternatives for 
the social economic development of the region. While, Chavez legacy in Venezuela was 
sufficiently strong to secure the presidency of his protégé, Nicolas Maduro, it is 
unquestionable that the Post-liberal, post-hegemonic, movement in South America lost one of 
its biggest promoters. The impact resulting from the loss of these two crucial players in the 
South American post-hegemonic efforts remains to be seen, but their influence was so 
significant, that it is likely to be felt in the future of the organization. Without such influential 
promoters the post-hegemonic movement in South America can potentially weaken having 
significant implications for the application of this theory to the region. With the decline in 
support for the leftist governments, the focus on the asymmetries of globalization and 
alternatives to neoliberalism (as highlighted by hypothesis 7 and 8) may no longer play a 
significant role in the regionalisation effort in South America thus contradicting the 
assumptions made by PHR.
Another issue impacting the potential for security integration in UNASUR under the 
auspice of Post Hegemonic Regionalism, relates to the increasing conflictual relation among 
its member states. Unresolved territorial disputes between UNASUR's members, such as 
those between Argentina and Chile, and Colombia and Venezuela, if continued unresolved 
have the potential to drive a wedge between the member states. Economically speaking, the 
lingering effect of the global financial crisis has lead many of the countries in the region to 
revert back to protectionist measures that fly directly against the many agreements reached 
thus far through UNASUR and is constituent organizations, CAN and MERCOSUR. 
Argentina in particular has increasingly opted for populist policies of nationalization and 
import tariffs on other members of UNASUR, which has lead to significant tensions 
particularly with neighbors Uruguay and Brazil (Financial Times, 2013). This potentially 
challenges the assumptions made by Hypothesis 7, as concerns over the distributional impact 
of globalization could instead lead to protectionism and the pursuit of unilateral actions, 
which will threaten the security and stability of the region.
But perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to the formation of a post-hegemonic 
security community in South America relates to the close relation and involvement of the 
United States in the security of Colombia. America has had a long history of involvement in 
Colombian security, most recently through the “Plan Colombia”, which aimed at ending the 
armed conflict and creating and anti-cocaine strategy through military/counter-narcotic aid 
(Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). American involvement in the Colombian conflict has proven 
incredibly controversial in the region, where its actions are often perceived to support and 
tolerate abuses by the Colombia security forces on the left-wing guerrillas (Riggirozzi & 
Tussie, 2012). This involvement is particularly contentious to Venezuela, who sees 
Washington-Bogota cooperation as a direct threat to its security. Furthermore, unlike the 
right-leaning government of Colombia, Venezuela has a more amicable view of FARC, who 
it prefers to label as an “armed group on the verges of the law” (Sanahuja, 2012). American 
and Colombian relations almost threatened the formation of the South American Defense 
Council, when President Uribe initially refused to sign the treaty citing the importance of 
cooperation with US and the still relevant role of OAS (IDSA, 2012). While these issues 
were eventually resolved, they have not disappeared, and Colombia's unwillingness to fully 
reject American presence in the region, may well lead to the fragmentation of the region. 
This in turn challenges hypothesis 8, as not all members of UNASUR are seeking alternatives 
to the neoliberal and American hegemonic influence in the region. Post Hegemonic 
regionalism therefore, while providing important insights with regards to South American 
integration, hinges much of its argument on the creation of a post-hegemonic, post liberal 
movement to promote regional integration and autonomy. While the “Pink Tide” certainly 
seems to suggest that post-hegemonic regionalism has played a role, its continued influence 
is far less certain, potentially making this approach more of a brief observation on a specific 
period of South American politics, than a definite explanation of the continent's regionalism.
6. UNASUR and EU Compared
In the section below, the UNASUR experience with security sector regionalism will 
be compared to that of the EU, through the insights presented by hypotheses of each 
theoretical approach. It is not the place here to conduct an in depth analysis of the security 
regionalisation of Europe, hence the analysis will only focus on the main differences with 
regards to the insights presented by the hypotheses. A comparison between these two cases 
can prove significant as it allows us to distinguish between regionalist features specific to a 
region, from those of the regionalism process in general. Through this analysis one hopes to 
provide valuable insight into the uniqueness, as well as a clearer understanding of the logic 
behind, South American security sector regionalism.
One of the biggest differences between the European and South American security 
sector regionalism, can be identified from the RSCT. Unlike UNSUR, the EU is but one of 
several bodies which govern the security of the European continent. Furthermore, unlike 
South America, where the RSC is well defined, and characterized as “standard” due to its 
lack of great power participation, the EU is part of multiple, and overlapping security 
complexes, which include the presence of the sole great power, the United States (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003). This great power presence has great significance in the way a RSC functions, 
in that it blurs the distinction between regional, intra-regional and global level security 
dynamics (Buzan & Waever, 2003). An example of how overlapping security complexes and 
the presence of the United States impact the security regionalisation of Europe, relates to the 
formation of NATO. NATO was created in 1949 as a system of collective defense, and can 
be seen as an attempt by the United States to forge a security complex to serve as a first line 
of defense against the communist threat. Through its constituent treaty, NATO could soon be 
understood as a security community where armed confrontation among its members became 
highly unlikely, and according to Article 5 of the treaty, “an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (NATO, 
1949).  The guarantees offered by NATO particularly in terms of inter-regional security, and 
as a deterrent due to American presence, allowed Europe through the formation of the EU, to 
focus its priorities primarily on economic integration and the creation of a common market. 
The American presence in the RSC, and the continuation of NATO, are welcomed because of 
the stabilizing effect they have in Europe, thus making American involvement a choice rather 
then a necessity (Buzan & Waever, 2003).
Aside from NATO, the EU and its constituent members have another intra-regional 
organization managing its security interactions, namely the OSCE. Established in 1974 the 
organization has seen its duties and membership expand over the years in response to the 
global political transformation. Today, OSCE encompasses 57 countries from North America 
to Asia. Together, NATO and OSCE illustrate how Europe has carried over a complex 
constellation of institutions from the Cold War, and according to Buzan, there is no reason to 
expect any change in this fragmented set up, aside for greater cooperation among these 
institutions (Buzan and Waever, 2003).  The reason, he explains, is because the evolution of 
the different organizations was not determined by an attempt to improve cooperation, but 
instead “by the competition and accommodation between states to have given issues handled 
within one organization and another” (Buzan and Waever, 2003). This has potential 
implication with regards to Hypothesis 1, as Europe's RSC are not as geographically limited 
as the theory would suggest. Instead Europe is part of several RSCs which extend across the 
globe including, European, North American and even Asian security partners. 
South American regionalism differs from that of Europe, in that it does not suffer 
from an overlap of different security complexes. The borders of its RSC are quite well 
defined, and UNASUR only suffers from occasional penetration by the United States, which 
has been actively rejected from the complex. In Europe, however, instead of pushing for 
further autonomy in its security affairs by replacing such far reaching agreements with EU-
centric ones, the individual security agreements have been kept and adapted in order to 
respond to current security needs. But what explains Europe's apparent willingness to accept 
American presence in its security complex? Some clues to this can be found in distribution of 
power within the region, as highlighted by hypothesis 3 of RSCT. American presence in 
Europe intensified after World War II with the post war reconstruction. In an attempt to 
counter the spread of Communism, the United States committed considerable resources to the 
rapid economic reconstruction of the continent. The state of the European economies meant 
that the only threat to American hegemonic influence in the continent stemmed from the 
Soviet Union, and hence the functionality of the security complex (which according to 
hypothesis 3 of RSCT is determined in part by distribution of power inside the region), was 
greatly shaped by this American involvement. As the sole hegemon in Europe, the United 
State soon ensured that through security arrangements such as NATO and OSCE, Europe 
would remain a sphere of influence of the United States, and thus becoming part of its 
security complex.
While the NRA, does not necessarily fit with the model of security regionalism in 
South America, it produces some important insights with regards to Europe, which may help 
us understand some of the crucial difference in the security regionalisation of the two. With 
regards to American presence in the security considerations of Europe, NRA provides two 
important insights. The first relates to Hypothesis 4, and the impact of globalization as a 
catalyst for regionalism. With the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, the 
shared security concerns between the US and Europe became even more intensified and 
increasingly complex. US presence in Europe’s RSC meant that shared globalized security 
issues such as international terrorism, energy security and migration, could not be 
realistically resolved unilaterally. Furthermore, the geographic centrality of Europe meant it 
also shared many security concerns with countries further East, which in turn meant that they 
required cooperation with a much broader set of actors. Hence, instead of opting for the 
abandonment of previous security agreements in favor of Euro-centric ones, the European 
states opted for adapting the current agreements in order to deal with the new emerging 
threats which it shares with states beyond the European borders. 
In contrast, while South America is certainly experiencing the security impacts of 
globalization, it is definitely not to the same extent as Europe. Unlike Europe, South America 
is not directly threatened by international terrorism, and is mostly preoccupied with home 
grown leftist movements. Furthermore, being clearly geographically delineated and 
surrounded by oceans, provides the security complex with a certain level of protection and 
helps set clear borders for what it deems as essential partners in its security cooperation. Thus 
with regards to hypothesis 4, while concerns over globalization influenced the security 
regionalisation of both the EU and South America, it produced different results for each, with 
Europe necessitating cooperation with a much broader set of actors, in large part due to its 
overlapping security complexes. 
Another important insight of NRA, which helps explain the EU's willingness accept 
the US as a natural member of its security complex, relates to its characteristic embrace of 
liberal policies and open regionalism. For NRA, the signing of the Single European Act 
demonstrated Europe's goal of regionalizing by creating as large and unfretted a market as 
possible, developing a regional economy capable of generating more flows than diverts, 
ultimately enriching the participant states and  reinforcing them both economically and 
politically against third countries (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). This embrace of neoliberal 
economic programmes, resonates well with the Washington Consensus, and neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy can now be considered the norm in Europe. Therefore, unlike South 
America where the “Pink Tide” and the subsequent push for regionalisation by the leftist elite 
sought to distance itself from the US and its neoliberal practices, Europe continues to accept 
the Washington Consensus as natural aspect of its economic and political security. 
Finally, another crucial difference between UNASUR and the EU as highlighted by 
hypothesis 6 of NRA, relates to the plurality of actors involved, and the much more 
pronounce role of civil societies and the population at large in the decision-making of the EU. 
As previously mentioned, hypothesis 6 is only partially applicable to the South American 
case, as its regionalisation has been predominantly dominated by the state, and highly reliant 
on key presidential figures in a process often referred to as “presidentialism”. The EU on the 
other hand, has had a much longer institutional history, which in turn has allowed it to put in 
place mechanisms for public participation as well as a more pronounced role for non-state 
actors. Through a well functioning and directly elected European Parliament, as well as the 
ability of the population to reject EU agreements on the basis of a referendum (as was the 
case with the planned EU Constitution), Europe's population is able to directly impact the 
continents regionalisation. Civic influence in approving the integration agenda of the region 
has had a great impact in the security integration of the EU, and may help explain why high 
visibility security issues, such as the formation of an European army, has struggled to take 
place in the face of low public support among some member states. Therefore, hypothesis 6 
seems to provide stronger evidence with regards to Europe's regional functionality, than it has 
with South America, in turn highlighting the potential impacts non-state actors can have on 
the functionality of a region.
Finally, with regards to Post-Hegemonic Regionalism, it would seem odd at first to 
apply a theoretical approach devised for South America to the European Union. However, is 
it possible that the EU is slowly entering a post-hegemonic period in its politics? As the 
impact of the European economic crisis deepens, there has been increased dissatisfaction 
with the current model of economic integration and trade liberalization. The dominance of 
certain economies over others, as well as a focus on austerity as the solution to the debt 
problems, have caused wide spread dissatisfaction with the way in which the EU project is 
being run “in Brussels”. As a result, voters across Europe have begun to voice their 
disappointments at the polls, with countries such as Italy and Greece experiencing increased 
levels of so called “protests votes”, while French voters removed the right-leaning 
government of Nicolas Sarkozy and replaced it with the left-leaning, anti-austerity Francois 
Hollande. Its is too early to tell if the response by the European population to the crisis will 
result in Europe entering a post-hegemonic period and rejecting the Washington Consensus, 
however, it is clear that the rejection of neoliberal programmes has so far been mainly 
confined to the economic spectrum. With regards to security, there have been some tensions 
among American and European interests in the past, as was the case with the Iraq War. 
However, those can be understood as mere irritants and are not likely to lead to a complete 
rejection of America in the security consideration of the continent (Buzan & Waever, 2003). 
Furthermore, in the face of mounting economic pressures, it seems unlikely that the EU 
would pursue a more independent security approach, as it is still highly dependent on 
American hardware and financial backing to sustain it security guarantees. These findings 
have implications with regards to hypothesis 8 of PHR, in which Europe, instead of looking 
for alternatives to the neoliberal dominance and rejecting American hegemonic presence, has 
instead fully embraced it.
This comparison, however, does provide an important lesson that can be cautiously 
transferred across both regions, namely that regional integration is a process and not a 
product (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). As suggested by hypothesis 5, once it begins, peaceful 
and voluntary integration can proceed in a multitude of directions, producing various effects, 
and institutional results not initially imagined by those who initiated it (a similar insight to 
that presented by neo-functionalist with their concept of “spillover”) (Warleigh-Lack et al, 
2011). Furthermore, because regional integration has been a fairly infrequent occurrence, it 
becomes incredibly difficulty to predict how far it will go, not least since the motives behind 
regionalisation will likely change in the face of globalization (Warleigh-Lack et al, 2011). 
For the EU, this stop and go process has meant placing greater attention on economic 
integration, with security regionalism taking a back seat due to American presence and its 
overlapping security arrangements. For South America, the opposite seems to have taken 
place, as the rejection of Washington from the its security consideration has forced it to 
pursue regional security agreements, however, continued economic asymmetries and 
incompatibilities prevent further integration in the economic sector.  Finally, this lesson also 
has important implications for the future of Latin American integration, particularly with 
regards to feasibility of the more ambitious Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC). While definitely in its initial stages, the group has already held its inaugural 
summit in 2011, and despite the many economic and political differences among its 
members, the bloc is perceived as a way to increase the members' participation in global 
politics and shield them from the worst impacts of the global financial system (Rossi, 2010). 
More important, however, CELAC is a decisively Latin American and Caribbean project, and 
in its current incarnation, has no intent to include either the United States or Canada among 
its members. As this institution develops, it will be interesting to see how the U.S. responds 
to it, and whether CELAC will seek to exercise its unity against, or along side the United 
States (Rossi, 2010).
7. Conclusion
The success of European integration since the 1980's has spurred a wave of regionalist 
projects around the world, one of the most successful of which being South America's EU-
inspired Union of South American States. In the short years since the signing of its' 
constitutive treaty, UNASUR has already developed a significant level of security 
regionalisation through the formation of the South American Defense Council, increased 
military transparency and cooperation, as well as crisis management and foreign policy 
alignment. Comparatively, security sector integration in the EU has been a much longer and 
arduous process, and to this day it still remains largely fragmented into several institutions 
with overlapping aims and membership, and which at times extends beyond the European 
border.In the face of such apparent eagerness to regionalize its security sector, one can not 
help but question: what is the logic behind South American security sector regionalism?  
Furthermore, how and why does UNASUR's security sector regionalism differ from other 
regional integration efforts, such as those in the EU? In an attempt to answer these questions, 
this thesis analyzed three critical theories of regionalism, focusing particularly on their 
explanatory power with regards to a region's genesis and functionality.
Through this analysis one is able to derive some important conclusion with regards to 
the logic of security sector regionalism in South America. Firstly, Hypothesis 1 of RSCT 
helps explain the formation of UNASUR as a geographic contingent region with shared 
security problems. Furthermore, with regard to its functionality, Hypothesis 2 and 3 
demonstrates how the balance of power (particularly with regards to Brazil) and the patterns 
of amity and enmity between the member states greatly influenced the structure and 
functionality of UNASUR. Complementing this understanding, NRA provides greater 
emphasis on the impact of globalization and states response to global transformation. Its 
focus on non-state actors and its insistence on open regionalism, however, do not reflect the 
current politics of South America, whose regionalisation is marked more starkly by 
presidentialism and the rejection of the neoliberal programme. Thus, it would seem, 
particularly with regards to Hypothesis 4 and 6 that the NRA is not as suitable in explaining 
the genesis and functionality of UNASUR as the other approaches considered.  Finally PHR 
presents us with the understanding of South America security regionalism as a response to 
the asymmetries and distributional impact of globalization. It is characterized by the rejection 
of the Washington consensus by the predominantly leftist governments, in favor of 
alternatives to the neoliberal order. Much evidence can be found in support of both 
hypotheses 7 and 8, giving good credence to this theoretical approach. However, recent 
changes in the political scenario of South America all but guarantee a continuation of post-
hegemonic regionalism in the region, potentially threatening the application of this 
theoretical approach to the UNASUR case. 
By comparing these insights with those of the same theories but focusing on European 
security sector regionalisation, one is able to conclude that these three theoretical approaches 
offer crucial insights as to why, despite such similar ambitions, both organizations have 
sought such different approaches to security sector integration. South America's lack of 
overlapping security complexes compared to Europe, as presented by RSCT, helps us 
understand why Europe has maintained separate, and at times competing, security 
institutions. Furthermore, as suggested by NRA, U.S historical presence in Europe has been 
exacerbated by the security impacts of globalization, making their security concerns so 
interlinked that they cannot be reasonably resolved without each other. Furthermore non-state 
actors have a much bigger impact in the regionalisation of Europe, unlike South America 
where the process is still mainly state driven. Finally, and in contradiction to PHR, Europe's 
acceptance of neoliberal orthodoxy and open regionalism also helps explain why there has 
not been a more intense push for greater autonomy from the Washington Consensus. In fact, 
unlike South America, Europe has continuously embraced American presence, especially in 
its security sector, and therefore still perceives U.S. influence in the region as a stabilizing 
factor. 
While the findings of this analysis provides us with a better understanding of the logic 
behind South American security sector regionalism it also presents us with a set of limitations 
which must be addressed in future research. One of its biggest limitations relates to the 
theories selected. Due to theoretical parsimony, only three theoretical approaches were 
chosen. By limiting the selection of theories, one potentially overlooks valuable insights from 
different theories not considered in the analysis. Another critical issue relates to a lack of 
theoretical rigor in favor of a broader and more holistic approach. By combining the insights 
of different (and at times competing) theoretical approaches, one loses the predictive power 
of the theories and runs the risk of overly diluting critical theoretical insights. Finally, there 
are limitations with regards to the case selection. While the EU and UNASUR provide 
interesting cases for comparison, future research on the topic would greatly benefit from a 
comparison with the security sector regionalism of the African Union and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations, which can potentially reveal valuable insights with regards to the 
broader applicability of these theories, and security regionalism in general.
One important implication of this analysis is that it demonstrates how South America 
is attempting to forge it own process of regional integration, with as little influence from 
foreign intervention, and attempting to find local solutions to its shared problems. This in 
turn has implication with regards to future regional projects in the Americas, in particular 
CELAC. As this institution develops it will be interesting to see how to United States 
responds to its development, and whether CELAC will seek greater cooperation or distance 
from Washington. 
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